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Abstract 
Several papers in experimental economics use reaction times (RTs) to assess whether a decision is instinctive or not. 
This paper analyses a field experiment (the behaviour of athletes at the World Swimming Championships) in three 
steps, where only the (expected) payoff changes (i.e. increases) from one step to the next. The payoff depends on the 
time of the race, of which the RT is part. Considering, for each competition, a homogeneous sample of swimmers, the 
paper shows that RTs decrease as the expected payoff increase. The observed reductions are comparable in 
magnitude to those observed in other experiments, where conscious/cognitive process are induced (or, at least, 
present). The paper concludes claiming that a share of the observed RTs is determined through a cognitive process, 
and therefore RTs are not pure measures of instinctiveness.  
 
Keywords: reaction times, experiment, instinctiveness, cognitive processes 
JEL codes: C93, D03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*University of Torino, Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis” and CeRP-Collegio Carlo Alberto, 
Lungo Dora Siena, 100 I-10153 Torino (TO), Italy. Email: matteo.migheli@unito.it Tel.: +39 11 670 9630. 
3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Several economists consider reaction times (RTs) of individuals as relevant characteristics 
of the individual decision processes (Rubinstein, 2007 and 2012) . The idea that RTs provide 
insights into the process of deliberation prior to making a decision is very old in the psychological 
literature and, according to Stenberg (1969), dates back to 1868.  RT is generally defined as the 
time elapsing since a stimulus is received by the individual to when s/he responds to that stimulus. 
RTs have been taken as a measure of how much the response is instinctive; in particular, the 
shorter the RT (i.e. the faster the response to the stimulus), the more instinctive the (mental) 
process that led to the response (Rubinstein, 2007 and 2008). In Rubinstein’s words: “choices that 
require more cognitive activity will result in longer response times than choices which involve an 
instinctive response.”1 In other terms: where subjects play a strategic game, they can use 
strategies that belong to two different sets: instinctive and cognitive (Kahneman, 2011). Choosing 
a strategy from the former set requires less time than choosing one from the latter, since a 
cognitive process takes longer time than an instinctive reaction. Consistently with this 
interpretation, Brown et al. (2008) find that RTs are increasing with task difficulty2, but decrease as 
the subject becomes familiar with the game and, after some rounds3, tend to stabilise around a fix 
level.  Gabaix et al. (2006) find similar results: RTs are longer when people have to choose 
between similar rather than different alternatives. The proposed interpretation of RTs seems 
therefore consistent, even if reasoning leads sometimes to a higher payoff than instinct (Arad and 
Rubinstein, 2012) and sometimes to the opposite result (Piovesan and Wengström, 2009).  
                                                          
1 Rubinstein (2007), p. 1245.  
2 See also McEwan (1939).  
3 On the reduction of RTs as the subjects familiarize with the game see also Piovesan and Wengström (2009). 
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Sommer et al. (1990) Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) have already shown that, when an event 
is expected, the RT is shorter than when the event is expected. This is not surprising, and already 
shows that cognitive processes (in this case, expectations) can influence RTs. The present paper 
takes a step more, investigating whether RTs can be affected by variations in the payoff of an 
action. This is of particular interest for economics, since RT is determinant for maximising the 
payoff in several cases (auctions, trade in the financial markets, skill tests, etc.). For the purpose of 
this study I use a multi-stage game, where RTs contribute to determine the final ranking (and the 
payoffs) of the participants. Moreover, at each stage of the game the payoff is increased, while all 
the other characteristics of the game frame remain unchanged.   
The literature cited so far considers two types of RTs. Rubinstein (2007 and 2008) refers to 
the time elapsing between when an individual is presented a problem and when s/he responds to 
it (for example the time between a question and the answer). The other type of RTs is the time 
between some stimulus (for example a sound) and the beginning of the reaction to that stimulus. 
The RTs of type 1 include (usually) some cognitive process, while the RTs of type 2 are generally 
considered instinctive. Here I claim that also RTs of type 2 are partially the consequence of a 
cognitive reasoning and, therefore, the distinction between the two types is only apparent.  
 The extant literature considers most games where the payoff does not depend on how 
quick the subject responds to the stimulus, and therefore the deciders are not under the pressure 
of time. Several games used in game theory and economics are of this kind: the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the ultimatum, the dictator and the public goods games (Camerer, 2003) are examples 
such category. There are other games, however, in which RTs contribute to determine the payoff. 
Examples of these are the Dutch auctions, and the financial trading. Here the timing of the 
decision, and therefore the RT to the stimulus (changes the price of the item/security) are crucial 
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for the agent’s payoff. In particular, the fastest agent is the one who secure the auctioned item or 
the traded security. Although this is not synonymous of maximizing the payoff (winner’s curse in 
Dutch auctions), who comes late gets nothing or may have to buy at a price different from his best 
choice. 
Following Rubinstein’s (2001) argumentation that experiments should test economists’ 
assumptions rather than their conclusions, this paper challenges the current assumption of 
experimental economists that cognitive reasoning always results in a longer RT than instinctive 
reactions. However, in all the games analysed in Rubinstein (2001) the RT does not concur to 
determine the payoff. Nonetheless, there may be other games, in which RTs are part of the 
performance that determines the final payoff4. In this paper, I claim that if the subjects’ payoff 
depends on their RTs positively, then this influences the RTs to maximize the payoff.   
In particular, people will try to minimize the RT, and this minimization is likely to result 
from a cognitive (although perhaps unconscious) process. To test this hypothesis, I analyse the 
reaction times of swimmers disputing long-course World Championships. This is a natural 
framework, in which the subjects are not aware to be part of an experiment (actually they are not) 
and have strong incentives to behave “honestly” (after all, they have trained for a large part of 
their life to get there and dispute that gold medal!). Moreover, they are (self) selected in such a 
way to constitute a homogeneous group (same motivation, same goal, same training, same rules, 
same environment, and same incentives). The final time in a swimming race is the sum of two 
components: the RT and the time of the swim; a priori these can be classified as instinctive (the 
                                                          
4 An example is that of Dutch auctions, where a sort of clock proposes descending prices for the auctioned item, until one of the 
participants stops the clock and buys the item at the price indicated by the needle. Let suppose that at any given price more than 
one agent is interested in buying the item, and let suppose also that each participant attaches to the item a different value. This 
means that at any given price proposed, each agent has a net profit and that as the price proposed by the clock decreases, each of 
these net profits increases. Now, let consider two people with positive, but different net profits for a given price; if the RT is 
decreasing in the payoff, the winner of the auction will be the person with the highest payoff. 
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RT) and cognitive (the time of the swim). The reason is that the swimmers calibrate their effort 
during the swim, observing what the competitors are doing; in this sense, the time of the swim is 
the result of a cognitive process. Instead, the RT is (should be) the instinctive response to the 
starter’s signal, and should not involve any cognitive process. RTs in swimming are part of the total 
time that determines the final ranking, however their relative contribution to (and therefore their 
importance for) the total time decreases as the length of the race increases. Therefore, for 
example, the difference between the minimum and maximum RTs in the freestyle 100m finals is 
0.21s, while the average difference between the gold and the silver medals for the same distance 
is 0.19s. This means that there are cases in which shorter RTs can modify the result of the 
competition. This is true for the short races, while is not for the long, where the difference 
between the first swimmers in the ranking are much larger than in short-race competitions. In 
conclusion, RTs are relevant only for athletes who contend in short races. Therefore, if the prize is 
an incentive for the swimmers to shorten their reaction times, this should be observed more in the 
short than in the long races.  
2. Data and methodology 
The analysis is based on the results of FINA long-course World Championships from 2003 to 
2011. These are held every two years and only top-athletes are selected to participate. Although 
they are of different ages, they all have trained for years and have taken part in several top 
competitions; therefore, they are used to react to starting signals. All the results are released 
publicly and freely on the FINA’s website after each championship, since 2003. For each stage 
(heats, semi-finals – where provided by the rules – and finals) of each competition, the Federation 
discloses names and ages of the participating swimmers, reaction times, final times and rank, and 
intermediate times (at every 50 meters turn). Reaction times displayed in the federal official 
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releases represent the time elapsing from the starting signal to when the swimmer’s feet leave the 
block (Lyttle and Benjanuvatra, 2004).  
Swimming competitions are particularly suitable for the analysis conducted in this paper. 
Let now consider their structure: I will stress that, moving from a stage to the next, the payoff 
increases, while all the other aspects remain constant. Winning the gold medal requires to qualify 
for semi-finals first and for the final then. In the first stage (heats) the swimmers compete to 
secure one of the two semi-finals; this means that one must rank at least sixteenth after the heats. 
To dispute the final, an athlete must rank at least eighth at the end of the two semi-finals. The rule 
of distribution of the swimmers between the heats and between the lanes depends on their 
qualification time. This means that each swimmer competes against athletes of similar ability, and 
thus the individual performance should not be affected by different abilities of the competitors 
between the stages. Furthermore, the final ranking after each stage includes all the athletes who 
disputed that stage, it is based only on the final time of each swimmer, and does not depend on 
the position of the swimmer in the rank of his/her heat or semi-final.  These rules ensure 
constancy of incentives at each stage and that each swimmer observes directly5 contestants of 
similar ability through all the stages of the competition, and therefore the way in which the 
swimmers are sorted in the heats and in the semi-finals does not affect strategies and 
performances through the stages.  
According to the federal swimming rules, all the member national federations can enrol at 
most two athletes for each race; these first run the heats. Then, for short races (i.e. 50, 100 and 
200 meters) the  best sixteen swimmers at that stage gain access to the two semi-finals6; athletes 
                                                          
5 Each swimmer observes the seven competitors s/he is in the poos with.  
6 The regular swimming pool for competitions is divided into eight lanes.  
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swimming long races (400, 800 and 1,500 meters) access finals directly after the heats. Eventually 
the eight best semi-finalists (for short races) or the eight best performers in the heats (for long 
races) contend for the gold medal.  
The swimmers are allocated to the eight lanes of the pool according to their times in the 
previous step (in the case of semi-finals and finals), or to the time in the qualification trials for 
accessing the Championships (in the case of heats). The rule prescribes that the athlete with the 
best qualification time swims in lane 4, the second in lane 5, the third in line 3, the fourth in line 6, 
the fifth in lane 2 and so on. This means that the swimmers are allocated to lanes following a 
deterministic rule. Assuming that the best athletes have faster reaction times7, the process of 
allocation may engender some bias in what observed. For this reason, I rendered the samples 
analysed comparable, by considering, for each race, only the average RT of the eight finalists. In 
such a way, the reaction times of the eight finalist swimmers are considered. A possible different 
approach is to consider the reaction times of the eight best swimmers in each race. However, 
given also the high and positive correlation between the sample of the eight finalists and that of 
the eight best swimmers in heats and semi-finals, the results do not change8. A further problem is 
the interdependence between the observations in each race. It is likely to assume that the athletes 
react to both the auditive stimulus of the starter and to the visual stimulus of the other swimmers’ 
reaction. In other words, it is likely that the swimmers who wait for starting the race on the blocks 
react also to the movements of the first to start, and this engender interdependence between the 
                                                          
7 This is actually the case: especially in short races, the time differences at the end of the race may be smaller than the 
differences in reaction times between athletes. Hence, a swimmer may end first and another second just because the 
first was faster to react than the second was. In other words, the placement in the final rank depends also on the 
reaction time. Consequently, considering only the fastest eight swimmers reduce biases that may arise from different 
starting techniques, or different abilities to react.   
8 For brevity sake, the results for this sampling approach are not shown, but they are available upon request.  
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observations in a given race. However, the use of the average RT of the eight finalists for each 
stage solves the problem of interdependence.   
At this point, the means so calculated can be compared. In particular, for short races six 
comparisons are possible: across distances RT in each stage (heats, semi-finals and finals) are 
compared considering two consecutive distances in a time (i.e. 50m vs. 100m; 100m vs. 200m); 
then for each distance RT in heats vs. RT in semi-finales, RT in semi-finals vs. RT in finals and RT in 
heats vs. RT in finals. For long races, the same comparisons are performed, except for those 
involving semi-finals (that are not provided for these distances). The first set of comparisons 
allows analysing how reaction times change as the race distance varies (and therefore the value of 
an early reaction decreases); the second set shows the variations in RTs when the highest payoff 
increases going from qualification for the next stage to the gold medal. However, differences 
detected between different distances may be simply due to different trainings and approaches to 
the specific competition; in other words, since the value of a short RT decreases with the 
swimming distance, in their preparation the athletes who train for short races may focus more on 
RTs than the athletes who train for long races. This should not be the case when a given distance is 
considered, as the value of a short RT is constant across all the stages of the competition. 
Therefore, the comparisons between stages of a same competition are more robust and more 
informative than those between distances.  
Reaction times decrease with practice and training (Blanksby et al., 2002), however any 
difference in this respect between subjects disappears when they all constantly train (see for 
example Räty et al., 2002). For this reason, I selected only top athletes, and checked whether the 
RTs are different between different age groups (assuming that older swimmers have been training 
for more years). The correlation between age and RT is always extremely low (never larger than -
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7%) and never significant, witnessing that at the level of world championships, the training is no 
longer able to improve the RT of the swimmers, and therefore differences in age between the 
athletes do not matter in the present analysis9.   
3. Results 
The results are presented in three tables: the first (Table 1) compares the average RTs 
between different distances for a given step (heats, semi-finals, finals) of a competition across 
distances; the second (Table 2) reports the RTs between the different steps of a competition for a 
given distance. The third (Table 3), eventually, is the same as the first table, but displays the RTs of 
the swimmers who did not access the final step. 
Table 1 shows that the RTs grow with the distance to swim, that is as the share of the RT in 
the total time of the race shrinks more and more. However, this might just be due to different 
trainings: since RT is not important over long distances, then the athletes who run these distances 
do not work on reducing their RTs, in contrast with the swimmers who train to swim short 
distances, for which the RT represents a relevant share of the total final time. 
Table 2 compares the RTs between the different steps of a competition for a given 
distance. Here the figures show that the average RT decreases significantly from heats to semi-
finales and from these to finals for almost all the distances swam. This suggests the existence of 
some psychological mechanism that renders the athletes quicker to react to the starter’s signal, as 
the prize of the race increases from just qualification to the gold medal.  The result is interesting, 
as it reveals that, while RTs may well be a measure of how instinctive a response is, they appear to 
be influenced by the frame of the game. In other words, when the RT concurs to determine the 
                                                          
9 Should the opposite have held, the presence of very young swimmers in some competitions may have biased the 
results.  
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payoff, then the individual is able to influence it voluntarily. RTs seem to have two components: 
one strictly instinctive and another cognitive. Given the small reductions observed in RTs, the first 
component appears much larger than the second does. However, the reduction due to the 
psychological component is big enough to be of some value for the athletes who swim short 
distances.  
It is also noteworthy that the gains in RTs are on average very small, although sufficient, to 
modify the final ranking in some cases. For example, considering 100m competitions, in 16.8% of 
cases the average reduction in the RT between heats and finals (which is about 1.5 hundredth of 
second) is larger than the time difference between the gold and the silver medal. That figure 
reduces to just 5% if the competitions over 200m are considered, and converges to 0 for all the 
longer distances. Nevertheless, the RTs decrease significantly in all the competitions, but 800m 
freestyle, considered here. This suggests that the idea that “the faster the better” prevails on 
other rational considerations about the actual value of the reduction in the RT. A possible reason 
why the reductions in RTs are as small as observed is that the swimmers may be risk averse. 
Leaving the starting block twice before the signal entails disqualification, therefore the willingness 
to reduce the RTs may be compensated by the worry of disqualification, thus resulting in small 
reductions in the RTs10. Nevertheless, the value of the prize is larger in finals than in heats and 
semi-finals; as a consequence the athletes may also become more prone to take risks in finals than 
in the other stages of the competition. In other words, the shorter RTs in finales may result from a 
cognitive process that induces the swimmers to accept higher levels of risks, given the higher 
remuneration of winning a final than any other stage. Analogously, investors are ready to buy risky 
securities that pay high returns. That the reduction of risk aversion is cognitive is shown by the 
                                                          
10 This is consistent with Rubinstein (2012), who often finds a negative correlation between the RT and the probability 
of making a mistake, when the notion of a mistake is a clear cut.   
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absence of any statistically significant reduction in RTs in long-run swimming competitions. There 
the athletes know that, differently than in the case of short-run competitions, any small gain at the 
start will have no effect on the final ranking. As a consequence, the swimmers are not ready to 
take more risk, what reflects in RTs that do not decrease between heats and finals.   
Consider now the cognitive component of the total time. This is not interesting per se, as 
this time does not represent the time of a cognitive process, but rather it is the result of this 
process. However its variations are the consequences of a cognitive process, either because the 
swimmers put more effort in the final than in the heat (since the competition is for the medals and 
not just for qualifying), either because at least one put more effort and the others emulate that 
one or because of both. The data do not allow for choosing between these possible 
interpretations; however, all these possibilities are not mutually exclusive and do not change the 
interpretation of the results.  
Let now consider another interesting variable, which supports the cognitive interpretation 
of the reduction in the RTs. Table 3 presents the average percentage decrease in the swim time 
and in the RTs between a stage of the competition and the previous. Given that, while swimming 
in the pool, the athletes calibrate their effort considering the performance of the competitors and 
the goal of the race (i.e. qualification or medal), and given that swimming faster entails more 
effort, then the reductions in total time likely result from a cognitive rather than from an 
instinctive process. A main observation emerges: the order of magnitude of the reductions in RTs 
and total times is the same: around (or less than) one percentage point. Jentzsch and Sommer 
(2002) obtain an average reduction in RTs between 0.68% and 1.03%11, when cognitive processes 
                                                          
11 Jentzsch and Sommer (2002) propose two experimental treatments; the reductions in the RTs are different, 
depending on which treatment is considered.  
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are activated by passing from unexpected to expected stimuli. This figure is consistent with those 
found in the analysis presented in this paper; it is noteworthy that cognitive processes (that 
induced in Jentzsch and Sommer’s paper and that induced during the swim competition) lead to 
time reductions, which are very close to that detected in the swimmers’ RTs. This similarity 
supports the interpretation that the reductions in the swimmers’ RTs are the consequence of a 
cognitive process, rather than of some other instinctive mechanism. Now, the only change in the 
framework between the different stages of a swimming competition is the value of the individual 
position in the final ranking (qualification in the case of heats and semi-finals and medals in the 
case of finals). Therefore, it can be argued that the conscious process that leads to the observed 
reductions in RTs is led by the increase in the payoff at each stage of the competition.  
Last but not least, I would discuss a problem highlighted in section 2: swimmers may react 
to the movement of some other contestant. This reaction, of course, would not be cognitive, but 
instinctive. Let start by assuming that all the swimmers but the first-to-move react only to the 
movement of this latter. The results presented here would in any case suggest that the first 
swimmer to move reacts in shorter times as the final approaches. This would allow for concluding 
that the cognitive process, which induces the reduction in the RT of the first-to-move, is 
responsible of the reduction in the RTs of all the other contestants. In other words, although 
indirectly, the observed reduction in all the RTs would be anyway determined (also) by a cognitive 
process. However, if the reaction to the optical stimulus generated by the first-to-move were the 
only (or the main) explanation, then we should observe several swimmers to dive in response to a 
false start. Anecdotal evidence, however, generally suggests the opposite: the swimmers perceive 
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false starts as such and do not leave the starting block12. In other words, the visual reaction 
component, if any, seems to play a minor role in determining RTs. This supports the interpretation 
of the observed reduction in RTs in terms of a cognitive rather than an instinctive process.  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this paper is neither that of criticising the extant works based on RTs, nor to 
suggest that their conclusions are not valid. Rather, this paper aims at warning economists about 
the use of RT as an indicator of pure instinctiveness. In particular, what I wish to stress is that RTs 
seem to present two components: one instinctive and the other resulting from some conscious 
(say cognitive) process. The former part is much greater than the latter, at least in the framework 
considered in this paper (even if other authors found results of similar magnitude). There may be 
of course other cases, in which the cognitive process activated by the situation leads to an 
increase in the RTs of the subjects. This will then depend on which action (i.e. a reduction or an 
increase in RTs) maximises the payoff for the individual.  
One might argue that the results of this paper are relevant only when RTs are directly 
involved in determining the payoff. However, Rubinstein (2007 and 2012) shows that, in several 
cases, error rates in completing tasks correlate significantly with RTs, also in settings, where the 
payoff is independent of the time taken to complete the task. Therefore, also in these contexts, an 
increase in the (expected) payoff may induce the subjects to take more time for thinking before 
taking a decision. The data available so far do not allow for testing this hypothesis, which is left, 
then, for further research.  
                                                          
12 See for example the final of the freestyle 1,500 m. at the Olympic Games in London, 2012, or Labeid’s false start at 
the 2011 World Swimming Championships. In both cases only one swimmer dives, while all the others remain on the 
starting blocks.  
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The results presented in the paper do not hinder the use of RTs as a measure of the 
instinctiveness of a response. They only show that RTs are sensitive to the payoff of the game and 
are slightly modified in order to maximise the probability of getting the highest payoff. Apparently 
consciousness has only a small (tough relevant) effect on RTs; therefore large differences between 
RTs may still indicate that some decisions involve more cognitive processes than others do.   
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Table 1. Comparison of RTs between competitions over different distances at a given stage (hundredths of second).
Heats
50 metres 100 metres 100 metres 200 metres 200 metres 400 metres 400 metres 800metres 800 metres 1500 metres
72.48 73.71 73.71 75.85 75.85 79.43 79.43 82.79 82.79 84.06
Significance
Semi-finals
50 metres 100 metres 100 metres 200 metres 200 metres 400 metres 400 metres 800metres 800 metres 1500 metres
71.98 72.96 72.96 75.36
Significance
Finals
50 metres 100 metres 100 metres 200 metres 200 metres 400 metres 400 metres 800metres 800 metres 1500 metres
70.83 72.18 72.18 74.49 74.49 78.97 78.97 82.59 82.59 82.33
Significance
Levels of significance: *90%; ** 95%; *** 99%.
-
- ***
** *** *** ***
-* *** *** ***
Table 2. Comparison of RTs between the different stages of competitions over a given distance (hundredths of second)
Heats Semi-final Final Heats Semi-final Final Heats Semi-final Final
72.26 71.98 70.83 73.42 72.44 72.10 75.57 74.83 74.49
Heats Final Heats Final Heats Final
79.43 78.97 82.79 82.59 83.39 82.39
Levels of significance: *90%; ** 95%; *** 99%.
50 metres 100 metres 200 metres
***
***
***
**
***
**
*** - ***
400 metres 800 metres 1500 metres
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Table 3. Reductions in total and reaction times from a stage to another of competitions, over a 
given distance (percentage figures).
Distance Semi-final - heat Final - semi-final Final - heat
Total times
50 mts -0.72 -0.16 -0.88
100 mts -0.72 -0.21 -0.93
200 mts -0.85 -0.22 -1.07
400 mts -0.44
800 mts -0.42
1,500 mts -0.47
Reaction times
Semi-final - heat Final - semi-final Final - heat
50 mts -0.39 -1.60 -1.99
100 mts -1.33 -0.47 -1.80
200 mts -0.98 -0.45 -1.43
400 mts -0.58
800 mts -0.24
1,500 mts -1.20
